Safety, Complexity, and Automated Driving: Holistic Perspectives on Safety Assurance by Burton, Simon et al.
This is a repository copy of Safety, Complexity, and Automated Driving: Holistic 
Perspectives on Safety Assurance.




Burton, Simon, McDermid, John Alexander orcid.org/0000-0003-4745-4272, Garnett, Philip
orcid.org/0000-0001-6651-0220 et al. (1 more author) (2021) Safety, Complexity, and 






Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Safety, complexity and




Fraunhofer Institute for Cognitive Systems, Munich, Germany
University of York, York, UK
John McDermid
University of York, York, UK
Philip Garnet
University of York, York, UK
Rob Weaver
Independent Consultant, Canberra, Australia
Abstract—This paper extends safety assurance approaches for automated driving by explicitly
acknowledging the complexity associated with the emergent system behaviour and its wider
socio-technical context. We introduce a framework for reasoning about factors that contribute to
this complexity as a means of more effectively structuring the discussion and thus aligning the
inter-disciplinary perspectives required to achieve a socially and legally acceptable level of
residual risk. The framework is illustrated by performing a post-hoc analysis of a high profile
accident involving a prototypical automated driving vehicle. We then apply the framework to
analyse the potential risks associated with the public introduction of Automated Lane Keeping
Systems (ALKS) for which regulation is currently being developed to prepare for deployment of
the systems on public roads. This analysis leads of specific recommendations both for the ALKS
in particular and safety assurance methodologies for automated driving systems in general.
HUMAN ERROR is by far the greatest con-
tributing factor to fatal accidents on U.K. roads
[1], whilst environmental effects (8%) and vehicle
defects (2%) play a relatively insignificant role in
comparison. Automated driving systems (ADS)
have the potential for making roads significantly
safer by optimizing traffic flow, recognizing and
reacting to hazards on the route ahead and limit-
ing the impact of inattentive and unreliable human
drivers. There is currently a drive to introduce
Automated Lane Keeping Systems (ALKS), with
a public consultation ongoing in the UK [2] at
the time of writing.
This paper extends the discussion on the
safety of automated driving systems beyond the
traditional focus of the engineering community.
We explicitly do not restrict our analysis to tech-
nological aspects but consider the role of gover-
nance, management and operation as well the role
of human factors in order to establish a holistic
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view of safety. In doing so, we acknowledge the
complexity of the problem at hand and the fact
that a “vehicle-centric” focus to engineering safe
automated driving may be inadequate.
As part of a study [3] commissioned by Engi-
neering X, an initiative coordinated by the Royal
Academy of Engineering and supported by the
Lloyd’s Register Foundation, the authors were
tasked with producing a framework (hereafter
referred to in this paper as the safer complex
systems framework) to provide conceptual clarity
around the factors that lead to systemic failures
in complex systems which have a safety impact.
This paper builds on the results of the study
and is structured as follows: in the following sec-
tion we discuss the relation of complexity to the
safety of autonomous systems. We then introduce
a framework for identifying factors that impact
the safety of complex systems. The framework
is illustrated by using it to model an incident
involving a prototypical automated vehicle and
then used to analyse the potential risks associated
with interactions between systems when deploy-
ing ALKS on public roads. A set of recommen-
dations for addressing complexity in the safety
assurance of automated driving is provided as is
an agenda for future work.
COMPLEXITY AND SAFETY
What is a complex system?
Complex systems theory defines a system as
complex if some of the behaviours of the sys-
tem are emergent properties of the interactions
between the parts of the system, where the be-
haviours would not be predicted based on knowl-
edge of the parts and their interactions alone.
From the perspective of complexity science
there are a number of characteristics that are
shared by most, if not all, complex systems. These
are variously described and defined in [4, 5] and
include, amongst others:
• Semi-permeable boundaries: The boundaries
between the system and the environment are
dependent on the scope of the system under
consideration, known as the system of interest.
This may vary depending on the objectives of
the analysis. For example, if focusing on the
functional performance of an automated vehi-
cle the system could be viewed as a set of elec-
tronic components which sense the environ-
ment, decide on control actions and implement
them via actuators. However, when considering
a mobility service as a whole, the system
includes other traffic participants, emergency
services and city or highway infrastructure as
well as the vehicle and impact on the use of
public transport [6].
• Non-linearity, mode transitions and tipping
points: The system may respond in different
ways to similar input depending on its state
or context. Non-linear behaviour can also be
caused by coupled feedback both within the
system of interest and between the system and
its environment. It is common to talk about
complex systems going through critical transi-
tions widely referred to as tipping points. Tip-
ping points can also be transitions into unsafe
states, and these can be emergent properties of
the system itself. The seemingly spontaneous
occurrence of traffic jams and stop-start traffic
on motorways are examples of such behaviour
within traffic systems.
• Self-organisation and ad-hoc systems: Sys-
tems can also emerge in an ad-hoc manner,
through a convergence of parts perhaps by
a process of self-organisation, or self assem-
bly. Here the (semi-permeable) boundary may
change as the system evolves. The adaption
in behaviour of human road users in response
to automated vehicles is an example of self-
organisation, where the humans become part
of a larger ad-hoc system. The ability of traffic
to spontaneously respond to approaching emer-
gency vehicles, even at complex intersections,
is an example of ad-hoc self-organisation.
Safety of complex systems
Traditional systems safety engineering fo-
cuses on component faults and their interactions
with other system components and therefore re-
quires some model of the system in order that
these interactions can be analysed. In contrast,
complex systems can give rise to systemic fail-
ures which do not necessarily arise from faults
in individual system parts. This bears a strong
and deliberate relationship to the definition of
complex systems and the notion of emergence.
Systemic failures originate from the interactions
between the parts of the system (their behaviours)
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and interaction with or dependencies on the en-
vironment, rather than faulty components, buggy
software functions or wear and tear – although
such things might be contributing, though not
sufficient, causes for a systemic failure.
The difficulty of arguing the safety of an ADS
lies in the inherent complexity and unpredictabil-
ity of the ever-changing environment in which it
operates. To compound the problem, the system
observes this complex, unpredictable environment
using sensors that themselves have inherent inac-
curacies due to the physical limitations of their
sensing modalities. This uncertainty is countered
by using multiple sensor types and algorithms
that make use of heuristics or ML to interpret
the sensing data. However, these algorithms are
themselves inherently imprecise and introduce an
additional level of uncertainty [7]. The unpre-
dictable nature of the impact of the vehicle’s
actions on its environment (e.g. the reactions of
other drivers and road users) “closes the loop” to
the complex environment to be interpreted by the
vehicle. Thus implementing ADS brings with it
potential for systemic failures due to interactions
between these uncertainties within the perception
and control cycle.
Risk reduction measures, or controls, to re-
duce the probability of safety-related failures can
include engineering changes at design time, or
procedures and processes implemented during
operation. Controls can be grouped in very broad
terms into those that enable:
• Robustness – the ability of a system to cope
with foreseen events.
which we contrast with:
• Resilience – the ability of a system to absorb
the unforeseeable and remain unchanged.
Both resilience and robustness are tools for
reducing risk, with resilience more important
in dealing with the uncertainties arising from
complexity. Complexity science uses these terms
rather differently and, for example, resilience is
used to mean that the system returns to its original
state or maintains its original function. Here,
resilience might mean that the system changes
behaviour (or even purpose) but continues to op-
erate safely in the presence of unforeseen events.
THE SAFER COMPLEX SYSTEMS
FRAMEWORK
The framework we propose provides a struc-
ture for reasoning about factors that contribute to
systemic failures due to complexity and contex-
tualises measures and controls to manage risk.
As visualised in Figure 1, the central axis
of the safer complex systems framework shows
a flow from causes of system complexity via
their consequences to systemic failures. This
is analogous to the progression from faults to
erroneous system states to system failures under-
lying traditional functional safety engineering as
promoted by Laprie et al [8]. However, as noted
above, systemic failures arise out of emergent
properties of the system caused by complexity,
not from faults in individual system elements, and
that the inter-dependencies between system ele-
ments as well as the causes and consequences of
complexity are more subtle than a simple cause-
effect relationship – however, the visualisation of
Figure 1 is chosen for ease of explanation and
discussion.
The emergence of systemic failures can be
tempered by controls at design-time and dur-
ing operation. These reduce the likelihood that
systemic failures arise by either suppressing the
causes of complexity or by reducing the likeli-
hood that emergent complexity leads to the failure
to maintain a system objective. The framework
also recognises exacerbating factors that can
make systemic failure more likely by either am-
plifying the consequences of system complexity
or undermining control measures. Inherent uncer-
tainty in our knowledge of the system and its
boundaries, the models we use to reason about
the systems, or the technology itself (e.g. use
of machine learning techniques) are examples of
exacerbating factors that can increase the conse-
quences of complexity or undermine controls.
In many cases, causes of complexity as well
as the controls for managing safety are regulatory,
organisational or financial, instead of, or in addi-
tion to, technical. Furthermore, not all systems are
explicitly engineered; they can also arise from ad
hoc interactions between systems or components
previously considered unrelated. This requires
radically different approaches and viewpoints to
previously applied safety engineering and man-
agement techniques that were based on clearly
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Figure 1. The Safer Complex Systems Framework
defined system boundaries. The framework is
intended to address both designed and ad hoc
systems and considers a system through the lens
of the following strongly interacting viewpoints.
These can be seen as layers within the overall
model, akin to those found in Rasmussen’s risk
management framework [9].
• Governance Layer: This layer consists of
incentives and requirements for organisations
to adhere to best practice through direct regu-
lation, so-called soft law approaches or a con-
sensus in the form of national and international
standards. Through these means, governments
and authorities represent societal expectations
on the acceptable level of residual risk that is
to be associated with the systems.
• Management: This layer coordinates tasks
involved in the design, operation and mainte-
nance of the systems, enabling risk manage-
ment and informed design trade-offs across
corporate boundaries, management of supply
chain dynamics and long-term institutional
knowledge for long-lived and evolving sys-
tems.
• Task and Technical: This layer covers the
technical design and safety analysis process
that allows systems to be deployed at an
acceptable level of risk, then actively moni-
tored to identify deviations between what was
predicted and what is actually happening so
that these gaps can be identified and rectified.
This layer includes not only the technological
components but also the tasks performed by
the users, operators and stakeholders within a
socio-technical context. In some cases, users
may be unwilling or unknowing participants
in the system who are nevertheless impacted
by risk.
Whilst developing the framework, examples
from a number of domains including aerospace,
mobility, healthcare and supply networks [3]
were analysed to identify common categories of
causes, consequences, systemic failures, exacer-
bating factors and controls across these three
layers. This resulted in a set of guide-words
that could be used as part of a structured anal-
ysis performed by interdisciplinary experts and
can also be based on a specific investigation
of previous system failures. The framework is
not intended to replace existing safety analysis
and management approaches. Instead, it provides
an additional perspective to allow the perceived
system boundaries, stakeholders and influencing
factors to be called into question, thereby pro-
viding a more robust basis for finding gaps in
current safety thinking and providing context for
more specific safety analyses.
APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
We illustrate the framework by examining
the issues surrounding the introduction of ADS.
For the purposes of this paper we understand
an ADS as a system that takes over control of
the vehicle while driving under a given set of
conditions. During this time, the driver can direct
their attention to other pursuits while the system
takes control of the vehicle. The driver must be
available to take over control when the boundary
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of the Operational Design Domain (ODD) is met.
An essential first step in the analysis is to
determine an initial scope of the system of in-
terest. Note that, as a result of the analysis,
factors outside the assumed system scope could
be determined to be relevant, leading to a revision
of that scope as part of an iterative process. For
the purposes of the example here the system
scope shall be defined as follows:
• System scope: Traffic infrastructure, traffic
participants, emergency services, regulations
and responsible authorities, including both
manually driven and automatically controlled
vehicles.
The next step in the application of the frame-
work is to analyse factors that lead to (intractable)
complexity and therefore the potential for sys-
temic failures. We illustrate the framework here
by performing a post-hoc analysis of an accident
to better understand the relationship between the
causes that lead to the system failure. The descrip-
tion of the accident summarised below is based
on the US National Transportation Safety Board
accident report and recommendations [10].
In March 2018, an automated test vehicle
operated by Uber Advanced Technologies Group
(Uber ATG) was involved in an accident in
Tempe, Arizona, that fatally injured a pedestrian
who was crossing a dual carriageway while push-
ing a bicycle. The circumstances surrounding this
accident highlight many of the risks involved
in introducing automated driving technologies as
well as the potential for systemic failures at the
task and technical, management and governance
layers.
Analysis of vehicle data demonstrated that up
until the impact, the vehicle variously misclassi-
fied the pedestrian as a vehicle, unknown object
and bicycle. On each new classification, the object
trajectory prediction algorithm would reset and
assign a new classification-dependent trajectory
prediction.
1.2 seconds before impact, the system iden-
tified an unavoidable collision. However, in or-
der to avoid the consequences of false-positive
mis-classifications, the system was designed to
suppress any braking manoeuvres in such a case,
due to the assumption that an attentive operator
would take control. The safety driver was, at the
time, viewing content on her mobile phone and
was therefore not able to react to prevent the
impact. Furthermore, emergency braking systems
pre-installed within the vehicle had been deacti-
vated in order not to conflict with the prototypical
functions under test.
The accident report [10] identifies inattentive-
ness of the operator as the most probable cause
of the crash. However, it also identified a num-
ber of additional contributing factors, including
inadequate safety risk assessment procedures at
Uber ATG, and ineffective oversight of the vehi-
cle operators, including lack of mechanisms for
addressing operators’ automation complacency.
Additional factors were identified as the ambigu-
ous nature of the piece of ground separating
the directions of the carriageway which appeared
to include pedestrian walkways, and ineffective
oversight of automated vehicle testing by Ari-
zona’s Department of Transportation.
The safer complex systems framework can
now be used to identify causes, consequences
and exacerbating factors leading to the accident.
The results of this analysis is summarised in
Figure 2. The following manifestations of system
complexity were identified:
• Governance: Rapid technological change, in-
sufficient competence and awareness regarding
associated risks and the competing objectives
of accommodating business needs vs. regula-
tory responsibilities led to a loss of regulatory
control at the state-level and inappropriate de-
ployment decisions. This ultimately led to an
increased risk to other traffic participants and
an avoidable accident.
• Management and operation: Inadequate en-
gineering and release processes related to the
novelty and complexity of the safety issues
involved, coupled with market pressure, trans-
ference of responsibility to an inadequately
trained and supervised operator led to not
only a technically inadequate system but also
operational procedures that did not adequately
account for (potentially unanticipated) classes
of risk.
• Task and technical: The complexity of the
environment and behaviour of different agents
within it was underestimated and emergent be-
haviours related to the interaction of the system
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and (the attentiveness of) the safety-driver as
well as of pedestrians and their surroundings
were not adequately considered leading to a
failure of the core driving function as well as
the primary backup which, in this case, was
the safety driver.
From this perspective, functional insufficien-
cies of the system at the technical level as well
as the behaviour of the safety driver can be seen
as emergent properties. They arose, at least in
part, from the management and governance levels
and the apparent failure of the duty holders to
understand and manage the risks associated with
operating such systems. There were insufficient
measures in place at the governance and man-
agement level to constrain the emergent risk of
deploying the technical system in its environment.
This may, in part, be due to a lack of understand-
ing (competency gap) of the system scope to be
considered as well as the potential for emergent
behaviours within the system that included the
vehicle, driver, pedestrian and road layout as
interacting constituent parts. The example also
demonstrates the conflicting pressures to promote
innovation in technologies such as automated
driving that have the potential for improving
overall road safety, while in parallel managing the
risk of integrating such technologies into existing
traffic systems with an insufficient understanding
of emergent behaviours.
Consequences for the deployment of ALKS on
public roads
In this Section we apply the safer complex
systems framework to a discussion of the risks
associated with the deployment of ALKS [2] sys-
tems onto public roads in the U.K. In doing so, we
describe the predicted effectiveness or otherwise
of existing control measures and identify where
further measures are required. The analysis was
based on a review of regulations [2], standards
[11], industry best practices [12] and lessons
learned from previous accidents such as [10]. The
set of guide-words identified when developing the
framework were applied to identify risk factors
and allocate them within the framework to better
understand their impact and inter-relationships.
The analysis resulted in the identification of a
number of themes where distinct relationships
were found within the various components of
the framework. These included the difficulty in
defining a tolerable level of residual risk and
liability for the systems, the issue of calibrated
trust [13] and automation complacency, an ap-
propriate definition of the operating domain, risk
transference between different stakeholders and
interaction with existing traffic systems.
Figure 3 shows causes of (unsafe) com-
plexity arising from multiple jurisdictions, semi-
permeable system boundaries, heterogeneity and
inter-connectivity on the safety of ALKS. At the
governance level multiple jurisdictions refers to
the regulations for smart motorways and ALKS
itself. At its simplest, the smart motorways rules
mean that vehicles should not travel in lanes when
a red X is shown and to move into other lanes; the
ALKS regulations do not address such signs and
do not require vehicles to be able to change lanes.
A systemic failure that can be linked directly to
this is lack of clear allocation of liability.
A further example of problems is the likely
heterogeneity and inter-connectivity between ve-
hicles fitted with ALKS giving rise to emergent
properties so that behaviour so the system-of-
systems is no longer predictable – particularly
if we consider how manually driven vehicles
might behave if they see an ALKS-fitted vehicle
proceed past a X. A design-time control to ad-
dress this and the above governance-level issue
involves refining the ALKS specification to deal
with smart motorway infrastructure, but also to
ensure sufficient consistency between different
manufacturers’ vehicles that they operate safely
in a system-of-systems. Although shown as a task
& technical level control this may also need to
be reflected at the management and governance
level, e.g. in regulations, if it is to be effective.
A related operation-time control is to enable
the infrastructure to “orchestrate” the behaviour
of the ALKS-equipped vehicles, for example to
ensure they all move in the same direction when
approaching a lane with a X. Such “orchestration”
could also deal with interaction between ALKS
and emergency services by, for example, forcing
the ALKS-equipped vehicles to create an “extra
lane” by moving in opposing directions and thus
allowing emergency vehicles through.
Thus, greater inter-connectivity is likely to
be needed to enable safe introduction of ALKS.
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Figure 2. Freak accident or causal inevitability? The Uber Tempe fatality
However, this will inevitably lead to additional
emergent properties including issues of cyber-
security and a consequential interplay between
safety and security. To address such changes
requires further iteration, thinking through the
impact of the changes, including the possibility of
cyber-security weaknesses introducing common-
mode failures.
Due to the rapid technological changes driving
the transformation of the mobility sector, it is not
feasible to expect that traditional approaches to
standards development will keep pace with the
rate of change. Therefore, outcome-based regula-
tion that stipulates requirements on what to argue
instead of how to argue safety is to be devel-
oped; it should take a systems-oriented view with
additional focus on arguing the effectiveness of
controls for reducing risk due to system complex-
ity. Published standards and regulations should be
supported by publicly available specifications that
provide more specific guidance and document
current industry consensus on topics such as
assurance activities for machine learning in an
automated driving context. These specifications
can be developed in a more agile manner than
full standards and can therefore be continuously
updated to reflect the state-of-the-art.
A consensus on safety targets for automated
driving must be actively developed including a
diverse range of stakeholder perspectives beyond
just manufacturers and technical approval au-
thorities. This should consider both quantitative
targets (e.g. based on accident statistics) as well
as qualitative measures (based on engineering
practices and operation-time controls) for achiev-
ing acceptable levels of residual risk. This will
require cross-disciplinary dialogue involving not
only technical but also legal and ethics experts
[14]. Wider engagement with the public in gen-
eral is also required in order to consider the
perspectives of those most impacted by risk, and
also to gain an understanding of the expectations
and assumptions made on the systems by the
users. This is required in order to reach a level
of trust and acceptance of the systems, without
which the safety benefits of increased automation
will also not be realised.
Consequences for safety assurance of
automated driving
The manifestations of complexity described in
previous sections introduce uncertainty across the
entire assurance process; models of the ODD used
to design and validate the system are inevitably
incomplete and imprecise due to the complexity
of the environment; technology used within the
systems both in terms of the sensors and actu-
ators as well as the algorithms themselves are
inherently imprecise (e.g. based on the use of
Machine Learning). Furthermore, due to a lack of
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Figure 3. Analysis of interactions between ALKS and other traffic systems
clear definitions of safety targets and the lack of
established best practice, the assurance case itself
may include assurance gaps, leading to incon-
clusive arguments. Complexity and the resulting
uncertainty must therefore be considered within
all phases of the safety management processes
and means must be developed for arguing that
the residual risk of such systems is nevertheless
tolerable.
During domain analysis, an understanding is
developed of the safety-relevant properties that
must be maintained within the chosen operating
environment. In addition to properties of the
ODD itself, critical for ensuring the performance
of perception and control functions, this phase
must also ensure a sufficient understanding of
societal and legal expectations on the system for
it to be considered safe enough. This analysis
must take place within an assumed scope of the
system under consideration and its interactions
with its environment. This system scope shall be
continuously validated and adjusted to ensure that
critical interactions are considered in the safety
assurance approach.
The system design refines the expectations on
the system discovered during the domain analysis
into technical requirements on the system and
identifies a system design capable of supporting
the system’s safety goals. The safer complex sys-
tems framework can provide indicators related to
risk associated with the complexity of the system
and its context, its operation and interaction with
human actors that should be considered during
detailed safety analyses.
Causal approaches to safety analysis such as
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [15] are based on a
model [8] of how faults in individual system
components cause an erroneous system state (er-
ror) that may subsequently lead to a failure of
the system’s service as perceived by its users.
However, one of the consequences of complexity
is the presence of unknown and unknowable
faults and causes of systemic failures as well as
a high level of inter-connectivity and non-linear
interactions. There is also a need to be able to
model the impact of uncertainties both in the
environment as well as the internal behaviour
of the system [16]. System-theoretic approaches
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such those recommended by Rasmussen [9],
Leveson’s System Theoretic Accident Methods
and Processes/System Theoretic Process Analysis
(STAMP/STPA) [17] and Hollnagel’s Functional
Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM)[18] take
a more holistic view of risk factors within a
system across technical, management and gover-
nance layers. These methods have the potential
to better consider the causes and consequences
of complexity within the system across these
layers. We therefore strongly recommend that
these methods are applied when preparing for
the deployment of ALKS onto public roads.
Monkhouse et. al [19] recently proposed an en-
hanced vehicle control model that considers the
shared cognitive nature of the driving task for
driver assistance systems with limited autonomy.
This approach allows the subtle interactions be-
tween the task (human-controlled activities) and
technical (system-controlled activities) within our
framework to be more systematically analysed,
for example extending STAMP [17] or FRAM
[18] type methods.
An analysis of complexity factors that could
lead to systemic failures can provide information
for verification and validation by determining
sets of assumptions that must be confirmed and
specific properties that must be validated during
field tests and operation. Relating back to the
Uber ATG accident described previously, this
could include validation of assumptions made
regarding the performance of the safety driver or
about the behaviour and occurrence probabilities
of pedestrians on certain types of roads.
Statistical arguments based on miles driven
between incidents during field-based tests become
both unfeasible and ineffective due to the effort
required to collect the data and the difficulty
in ensuring sufficient coverage of edge cases
and critical situations. The increase in use of
simulation during the design and validation of
the systems allows for a more targeted testing
of critical and rare situations. However, such ap-
proaches require additional arguments regarding
the accuracy and the ability to extrapolate the
results of simulation into the target domain.
We consider the greatest benefit of explicitly
considering complexity factors lies in the for-
mulation of the assurance case [20] and more
specifically the reduction of assurance gaps. Ap-
plication of the safer complex systems framework
can lead to an assurance case that better reflects
the actual system context and risks associated
with the system and its operating context. This
could be achieved by integrating consideration of
complexity factors throughout the claims and evi-
dence provided in the assurance or by formulating
specific claims and targeted evidence focusing on
the causes of systemic failures in the system.
Safety assurance of automotive systems cur-
rently places a strong focus on design-time con-
trols and type approval. However, as the complex-
ity and scope of the systems increases, and with
it the sensitivity to an ever evolving environment,
it is unrealistic to believe that an adequate level
of safety can be achieved before the system is
deployed that can be maintained over the vehi-
cle’s lifetime – without ongoing controls and the
potential for updates to the system. Operation-
time measures are required for ensuring the safety
of the systems that includes the measurement
of critical observation points within the system
(leading indicators of systemic failures) as well
as whether assumptions made regarding the ODD
and therefore the validation approach continue to
hold. The assurance case for the system should
be continuously evaluated and refined, based on
experiences in the field and changing expectations
on the system. This holds true for automated
driving applications but also to connected traffic
infrastructure in general.
CONCLUSIONS
Assuring the safety of autonomous vehicles
is a complex endeavour and the deployment of
automated vehicles within a public traffic infras-
tructure must be recognised as a complex system
requiring complexity thinking. By this we not
only mean that it is just technically difficult,
or involves many resource intensive tasks that
must somehow be managed within feasible eco-
nomic constraints. Both are true. But autonomous
vehicles and their wider socio-technical context
demonstrate characteristics of complex systems
in the stricter sense of the term. This has a huge
impact on our ability to argue the safety of such
systems.
This paper proposed a framework by which
factors impacting the complexity of the system,
thus leading to systemic safety failures, can be
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identified and used to inform a safety assurance
process. We conclude from the analyses described
in this paper that ensuring and demonstrating the
safety of automated driving systems requires a
more comprehensive and holistic view of safety
than for previous generations of vehicle electronic
control systems. A systems-oriented approach
that acknowledges complexity and includes co-
ordinated measures across governance, manage-
ment and task and technical layers is required
in order to reach an adequate level of safety
for automated driving systems. This will require
closer collaboration between domains such as
automotive manufactures and suppliers, commu-
nication and highway or city infrastructure as
well as a better understanding of dependencies
across the three layers and stakeholders within the
framework which includes the role of the general
public.
The safer complex systems framework, at this
stage in its development, seeks to provide an
accessible overview of the factors that influence
the safety of complex systems. As presented, the
framework indicates only the highest-level depen-
dencies between elements of the framework. Fur-
ther work will involve enriching the framework
by integrating various safety analysis methods as
well as domain-specific risk models in order to
allow the framework to be integrated into safety
analysis and management during system design.
Work is also ongoing to validate the framework
in other domains including urban air mobility and
healthcare. Most significantly though, the authors
see the strongest need in establishing a systems-
thinking mindset that acknowledges complexity
and uncertainty both at the governance and man-
agement layers as ultimately it is here where
the levers are most effective to ensure that our
traffic systems remain safe, and become even
safer through the introduction of autonomous
technologies.
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